Michigan Law Review
Volume 82

Issue 4

1984

Founders and Foundations of Legal Positivism
David Lyons
Cornell University

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
David Lyons, Founders and Foundations of Legal Positivism, 82 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1984).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/10

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

FOUNDERS AND FOUNDATIONS OF
LEGAL POSITIVISM
.David Lyons*
EsSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL
THEORY. By H.L.A. Hart. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1982. Pp. viii,
272. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $12.95.
JOHN AUSTIN. By W.L. Morison. Stanford: Stanford University
Press. 1982. Pp. x, 239. $20.
The tradition of legal theorizing that we call "positivism" embraces two principal, related ideas: first, law is a species of empirical
fact; second, law must be distinguished from morality - in particular, we must not confuse the law that we actually have with the law
as we would like it to be. These two elements are connected by the
notion that, whatever facts determine what it is to have law, they
leave it an open question whether a given system of law or particular
laws within it merit respect.
Positivist ideas were given their first systematic development by
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Austin (1790-1859). These
theorists had specific conceptions of law and morality from which
later positivists have diverged. Contemporary positivists generally
reject the notion found in Bentham and Austin that law is to be understood as a set of coercive commands. And some (but by no
means all) l~ter positivists seem to have regarded moral judgments
as incapable of justification, thus departing from the Bentham-Austin view that sound moral principles can be identified and that they
are capable of grounding warranted criticism and reform of legal
institutions.
Whatever one may think of their specific theories, the foundational work of these two writers has had a profound effect on the way
we think of law. The richness, originality, and rigor of their contributions set new standards for legal theory. As a consequence, their
specific views have provided a point of departure for subsequent
developments.
These two theorists and their ideas are the respective subjects of
two new books, one on Bentham by H.L.A. Hart and one on Austin
by W.L. Morison. The books vary greatly in style, structure, and
• Professor of Law and Philosophy, Cornell University. B.A. 1960, Brooklyn College;
M.A., Ph.D. 1963, Harvard University. Professor Lyons' books include FORMS AND LIMITS OF
UTILITARIANISM (196S) and ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1984). - Ed.
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content; they also raise vastly different questions. It will be useful to
discuss them separately.
I. HART ON BENTHAM
Hart's Essays on Bentham comprises ten chapters and a substantive Introduction that traces themes among them. Much of the book
has not been published before. It is in any case a coherent collection:
the whole is much more than the sum of its parts. The boo~ is also
broader than its title suggests; its subtitle, Studies in Jurisprudence
and Political Theory, is more descriptive.
·
Not that Bentham is neglected. His most fundamental ideas
about law and legal concepts, philosophical method and political responsibility, utility and rights are presented by Hart with extraordinary clarity, developed further, and criticized constructively.
Bentham's insights and limitations are considered, as well as his
links with Beccaria, Austin, and John Stuart Mill. But Hart's studies
of these topics go much further. The foundations of legal theory and
the nature of moral rights, legal rights, duties, powers, and sovereignty are explored.
This collection is as rich in scholarship and philosophical reflection as one has come to expect from Hart, the most distinguished
contemporary legal philosopher, whose own work has inspired many
to reflect systematically on the nature of law and its relations to morality. It would be profitable to pursue many of the topics dealt with
by Hart, but that would be impossible in a brief essay. I shall concentrate here on two. One has received considerable attention in the
literature: natural (and other) rights. The other has received much
less direct attention: the relations between analytic and moral
theory.
A. Natural Rights

As is well known, Bentham dismissed the very idea of a "natural
right" as nonsense. Somewhat less well known is the fact that Mill
sought to incorporate a theory of moral rights, and one that might
well accommodate natural rights, into his utilitarian conception of
morality. In a characteristically thoughtful essay (pp. 79-104), Hart
discusses the different approaches of these two writers to the problem
of rights and suggests the limitations inherent in those approaches.
Hart understands the basic idea of a natural right to be that of a
moral right which is possessed by each and every person. And he
understands moral rights as rights whose existence does not presuppose recognition or enforcement either by law or by informal social
conventions. We can infer this from the way rights are appealed to
in everyday moral reasoning. Our shared concept of a right does not
exclude the possibility of rights whose existence is independent of
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the law; nor does it exclude the possibility that each and every person might possess some such rights.
Bentham's analysis of rights implies the contrary. He held that
rights arise when, but only when, obligations have identifiable beneficiaries. He also held that obligations are the creatures of coercive
social norms. This entails that there cannot possibly be any moral
rights and a fortiori that there cannot possibly be any natural rights.
It follows either that aspects of everyday moral reasoning are
nonsensical or that Bentham's analysis is mistaken. Hart observes
that Bentham offered no general defense of his analysis. He speculates that Bentham objected
to the separation of the idea of a right from that of a law because it
introduces . . . 'criterionlessness'. That is, a hopeless indeterminacy
since such a separation, Bentham thought, deprives the notion of any
criteria for its identification and application. [P. 82).

But this would not explain Bentham's failure to acknowledge some
extralegal rights, namely, those that are the creatures of coercive social conventions which lie outside the law. If such conventions can
be identified, then presumably so can their implications concerning
the beneficiaries of the obligations that are imposed by such rules.
For that matter, Bentham's objection would not explain why he did
not entertain the possibility that some criterion other than one linked
with coercive rules might be used to determine when we have rights.
One candidate for such a determinate criterion of moral rights would
be Bentham's principle of utility. It would determine
liberty-rights when calculations of what would maximize.general utility [show] no reason for a man to refrain from some action and rights
to services when such calculations [provide] a reason for others to do or
to abstain from some action so providing the right-holder with such
services. [P. 85).

The trouble with such an approach, however, is that it would allow
only for "rights" that differ in significant ways from those we usually
invoke. The moral rights we think we have are much more stable
than, and are largely independent of, the highly variable results of
such direct utilitarian calculations. Furthermore, such a theory
would not capture
the peremptory character evident in the invocation of rights as justifying demands made on others, stating what they must do or not do
rather than what they merely ought to do or not to do. [P. 86).

The stability and peremptory nature of rights (or at least of one subclass of rights, often called "claims" or "claim-rights") would seem
to reflect the close links that rights have with obligations. Bentham
was correct in maintaining that rights have such a connection. He
was prevented from acknowledging moral rights, therefore, by the
fact that his conception of morality, based on direct utilitarian calculations, effectively excluded moral obligations.
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Mill recognized the role that rights and obligations play in everyday moral reasoning as well as the fact that they do not generally
presuppose coercive social rules. His theory of rights respects their
links with obligations and seeks to incorporate both into his own
form of utilitarianism. Rights and obligations, Mill believed, have to
do with just!fications for the use of sanctions. Mill understood the
judgment that a right exists as meaning that some persons have a
valid claim on society to secure something for them. That is his
sketch of a conceptual analysis of rights. His utilitarianism enters
the picture because to determine whether a particular claim about
rights is sound, one must use the test of general utility.
This sort of theory leaves room not just for moral rights in general but for universal rights in particular. People have moral rights
only when the relevant claim to societal protection can truly be defended. And if there are some things about which valid claims to
societal protection can universally be made, then there are some universal rights. If we believe that talk about moral and even universal
rights is not nonsensical (that the mere concept of a right does not
exclude their possibility) then Mill's theory represents a significant
advance beyond Bentham's. Hart believes, however, that Mill's theory is deficient.
Hart understands Mill to have claimed that a judgment that
someone has a right means that there is "a good moral reason for
having and maintaining a law or social convention conferring a
right" (p. 92). He also understands Mill to have recognized only one
valid sort of ground for such an assertion, namely, that it would
serve the general welfare to confer such a right. This corresponds to
one type of argument that is used for having or maintaining a law
that confers a right. Such arguments do not assume that those who
do or would benefit from the conferral of the legal right have any
antecedent, independent moral right to the benefits.
But sometimes, Hart notes, we argue differently for legal rights,
on the ground that they do or would respect rights that individuals
have independently of law. Sometimes, for example, we argue for
legal rights because we believe that certain individuals have already
earned the right to, or are otherwise due, special consideration on the
ground that they have assumed extra burdens for the benefit of the
community or have been treated unfairly and are due compensation.
Mill's theory implies that any such argument begs the question because it must be understood as holding "that the reason why there
ought to be a certain legal right is that there ought to be a legal
right" (p. 92). But if we do have moral rights, then it would seem
arbitrary to exclude the possibility of invoking them as grounds for
legal rights. If so, then Mill's theory is inadequate.
Hart's distinction between the two types of argument for legal
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rights is important. Writers who assume either a utilitarian approach to law or one based on normative "economic analysis" seem
to ignore the possibility of an argument for legal rights that presupposes the existence of independent moral rights. Hart understands
the distinction in the following way. Utilitarian arguments for legal
rights consider benefits and burdens to individuals aggregatively,
that is, with regard to net advantages and without regard to how
particular individuals may fare. Right-based arguments for legal
rights, by contrast, consider how benefits and burdens are
distributed.
Hart suggests that Mill's discussions of justice and liberty tacitly
reflect a tension within his thinking. Although officially committed
to aggregative or utilitarian arguments for legal rights, Mill seemed
nevertheless to recognize that affirmative assertions about universal
rights are based not on the net advantage of conferring legal rights
but rather on the moral importance of the fact that each and every
individual requires certain conditions for well-being. Hart concludes
by noting the continued need for a theory that explains how such
factors ground rights if we are "to make sense of the notion of universal moral rights" (p. 103).
Hart's discussion of Mill's theory seems to suggest the conclusion
that moral rights in general and universal rights in particular could
not be accommodated to utilitarianism. He suggests, for example,
that Mill could not consistently have adopted an analysis of rights
which would enable him "to make sense" of such notions. It should
be observed, however, that this cannot be inferred from the deficiencies of Mill's analysis that are identified by Hart. Hart's discussion
gives us reason to reject the analyses offered by both Bentham and
Mill. But it does not clearly give us reason to suppose that a more
adequate analysis of talk about rights could not be integrated into a
recognizably utilitarian moral theory.
Let us suppose that moral rights are capable of grounding arguments for legal rights, as Hart maintains. What a more satisfactory
utilitarian theory would seem to need, then, is an analysis of judgments about moral rights which does not reduce them to aggregative
or utilitarian arguments for legal rights. The utilitarian theory would
have to be capable of showing that people have some moral rights
and obligations which themselves have the stability and "peremptory character'' noted by Hart. Since rights and obligations play a
role in moral reasoning which is somewhat independent of direct
utilitarian calculations, such a moral theory would have to limit direct utilitarian evaluations. It could not regard them as alone determining the rightness or wrongness of behavior. The theory would
have to be a form of indirect utilitarianism.
I do not see how we can assume that such a theory is impossible.
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The trouble with such a theory, I think, is this. I understand the
various forms of indirect utilitarianism to be compromises between
the basic idea of utilitarianism (which involves no restrictions on direct applications of the principle of utility in evaluating behavior)
and our considered, reflective ideas about the role of moral rights
and obligations as well as morally justified legal rights and obligations in moral reasoning. For the latter does not allow direct utilitarian arguments alone to determine the rightness or wrongness of
behavior. The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that any such form of
indirect utilitarianism represents an awareness of the moral inadequacy of unrestricted direct utilitarian reasoning. 1
B. Analysis and Moral Commitme1Jt

Much of Bentham's work was concerned with the analysis of legal concepts. By this I mean not the identification and interpretation
of general principles that are embedded in the law but the explanation in more fundamental terms of the very idea of law and of the
more specific ideas such as that of a legal right or obligation. Thus,
Bentham was concerned to reveal not just what the law of a particular jurisdiction at a given time requires and allows but also what it is
for there to be law, what it is for someone to have a legal right, and
so on. A good deal of work within legal philosophy has focused on
such abstract questions. But the conriections between this seemingly
pure theoretical inquiry and the moral concerns or commitments of
legal philosophers have not been systematically explored.
In Hart's Essays on Bentham one finds occasional reference to
such connections. For example, Hart characterizes Bentham's analysis oflaw as "morally neutral" (p. 28) and indicates his approval (pp.
146-47, 161, 262-63). Hart also remarks that sometimes Bentham's
"utilitarianism gets in the way of his analytical vision" (p. 162).
These passages raise complex questions about the proper approach
to analysis.
One way of understanding Bentham's general approach to the
analysis of legal concepts is this: We are concerned with the possible
divergence between the law that is and the law that ought to be. One
cannot properly evaluate the law and develop well-grounded proposals for improvement or strategies for coping with its defects unless one correctly identifies and interprets the law that is (taking due
1. I discuss these matters further in Lyons, Utility and Rights, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND
THE LAW: NoMos XXIV 107 (1982). This seems the appropriate place to acknowledge Hart's
occasional references to my interpretations of Bentham and Mill on various matters, see, eg.,
Lyons, Human Rights and the General Welfare, 6 PHIL. & Pull. AFF. 113 (1977), from which he
frequently diverges. Hart's interpretations are always fair and are often more accurate representations of the historical texts. My concern has usually been to extract from such works
suggestions for more promising theories, though that motivation was not always made sufficiently clear.
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account, of course, of differences that may exist between what officials are supposed to do by law and what they actually do). This, in
tum, requires a faithful description of the crucial concepts that are
used in law, so that what the law requires and allows can be accurately represented, its implications can be understood, and the effects
attributable to law (under the circumstances that prevail) can be
estimated.
Such an approach suggests that the analysis oflaw and legal concepts must be "morally neutral" in the following sense: evaluation
presupposes accurate description, which presupposes accurate analysis. Thus analysis is logically prior to evaluation. Hart suggests,
however, that Bentham had a slightly different approach to analysis.
Bentham would not limit his role to that of a descriptive analyst because "his standpoint was critical and reformative" (p. 137). He was
not just "an Expositor concerned to analyse" the structure of the law
but also "a utilitarian Censor critical of the law" (p. 137).
In the role of Censor he could argue that the purpose of the analysis of
such notions as legal obligation or duty was to provide a set of clear
terms to be used in describing a legal system in a way which would
focus attention on aspects of prime importance to the critic, and among
these aspects of the law to which it was important to the critic to attend
are those points at which the legal system itself creates human suffering
or makes it likely. [P. 137].

So Bentham as a utilitarian would be prepared to offer a new, revised concept of legal obligation.
In the passages just referred to, Hart does not suggest any reservations about such an approach to analysis. In another essay, however, Hart remarks (as I have noted) that Bentham's utilitarianism
sometimes "gets in the way of his analytical vision" (p. 162). This
suggests that Bentham's analysis sometimes suffers because it is distorted by his utilitarian preoccupations. And yet Hart goes on to
suggest that an "individualistic critic of the law" would quite properly view the concept of a right somewhat differently from a utilitarian (pp. 192-93). Wouldn't the individualistic critic then be making
the same mistake as Bentham?
I think what Hart means is that, like everyone else, Bentham
thinks of rights as somehow advantageous. As a utilitarian, he naturally thought of advantages as benefits, which led him to develop a
benefit theory of rights. But this theory implies what is false,
namely, that one must be some kind of "beneficiary" in order to
have a right. Hart's point about the individualistic critic is misleading. The individualist, unlike the utilitarian, is primarily concerned
with choice, not benefits. This enables the individualist to appreciate
the independent fact that choice of one sort or another is, at bottom,
the advantage that is secured (in one way or another) to a person
with a right.
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All of this would seem to presuppose the significance of a distinction that I drew at the beginning of this section, namely between two
sorts of conditions that relate in different ways to the application of
normative terms (or to the exemplification of normative concepts).
We must be able to distinguish between the questions "What is it to
have a right (or obligation)?" and "What rights (or obligations) do
people actually have?" True answers to the former sort of question
must be logically prior to true answers to the latter sort of question.
In the case of moral rights and obligations, disagreements about
what rights and obligations people actually have must be compatible
with shared concepts of rights and obligations. Likewise, changes in
the substantive law which generate or extinguish rights or obligations must be compatible with relatively stable concepts of rights and
obligations. I have qualified this to allow for the possibility that,
over time and partly as a result of changes in law or moral beliefs,
terms like "right" and "obligation" can change in meaning; in this
sense, the corresponding concepts can be thought of as evolving. But
the previous discussion assumes that the relevant concepts have sufficiently determinate and relatively stable criteria of application based
on common usage in the respective realms of discourse.
Bentham's case suggests that a particular moral commitment can
get in the way of adequate analysis. But this does not appear inevitable. It would be a mistake to suppose, for example, that his utilitarianism logically impelled him to conceive of the advantages
secured by rights as benefits and that he could not have consistently
entertained the idea that those advantages involve choice. As utilitarians appreciate, choice is closely connected with benefit.
We might therefore draw a conclusion that Hart does not explicitly state: sometimes Bentham functioned as Censor when he should
have been Expositor. Bentham may have gone wrong because he
tried to do two distinct things more or less at the same time. He tried
to lay the conceptual groundwork for a system of social control that
he thought would be maximally useful to create and maintain. At
the same time, he tried to reveal the conceptual foundations of an
existing system of social control, namely law. The two sets of concepts are not necessarily the same. Moreover, I see no reason to suppose that a faithfully descriptive analysis of existing legal concepts
(part of the "expository'' function) is likely to interfere with one's
role as critic. The critical function would not seem to require that
existing law be analyzed in terms of revised concepts which, after all,
might be confused with those that are already embedded in the law.
If one wishes, however, to propose a new set of concepts on the
ground that it would be more useful to understand and appraise law
in such terms, then one's proposal must be supported by calculations
of the relative utilities of different ways of conceiving of social con-
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trol. To develop ;uch an argument, one must be able to assign utility
to both the existing and the proposed new concepts. But this requires that one first identify accurately the two sets of concepts. So
for this purpose, too, the two sets of concepts should be kept distinct.
All of this might seem to imply that the analysis of law must be
"morally neutral." But that is not the point at all. Our assumption is
that normative concepts have a certain degree of independence from
the directly relevant substantive norms. Thus, the idea of a legal
right remains stable through changes in the law and the idea of a
moral right is neutral with respect to different moral positions. This
implies nothing about the relations between legal and moral
concepts.
That relation is one of Hart's central concerns. He says, for
example:
The terms that Bentham uses to define law are all flatly descriptive and
normatively neutral . . . nothing in his definition is owed to morality,
and therefore nothing follows from the statement that laws so defined
exist as to any moral reason for obedience. [P. 28].

Hart makes clear that he endorses this approach to analyzing law
and that he regards it as an axiom of legal positivism, which "denies
that there is any conceptual or necessary connection between law
and morality'' (pp. 262-63).
Thus the positivist is committed to a conceptual claim that has
moral implications. He believes that there is not necessarily any
moral obligation to obey the law. This means not only that one may
sometimes be morally justified in disobeying the law, for that would
be compatible with the claim that there is always, necessarily, a
moral obligation to obey the law, though it is one which, like most if
not all other obligations, can sometimes be overridden. Hart's point
would seem to be, rather, that the very existence of any moral obligation to obey the law depends on conditions which are not necessarily
satisfied under a system of law.
I believe this to be true. But I think it is misleading to characterize the position as "moral neutrality," and my reasons go beyond the
point just made about the positivist's commitment to a substantive
moral judgment, which is liable to be controversial. If the positivist's
idea of a "separation of law and morals" is not merely arbitrary, it
must have some foundations. But on what could it be based? I shall
suggest that it can only be based on the exercise of moral judgment.
Let us note, first, that Hart's more general formulation of the
point is quite broad. He denies that there is any "conceptual or necessary connection between law and morality." I think this may be
misleading. I do not think that Hart would be concerned to deny,
for example, that there may be some conceptual connections between law and morality. If it were suggested, for example, that both
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law and morality essentially involve some general standards for conduct (so that the generic idea of a standard for conduct is common to
both and provides a conceptual link between law and morality), this
would not be taken as threatening to the positivist's ideas about the
"separation of law and morality." What Hart seems to suggest,
rather, is (very roughly speaking) that legal judgments of persons,
conduct, and so on, by themselves have no corresponding moral implications. For example, from the mere fact that I have a legal right
nothing follows concerning how, from a moral point of view, I or
others may properly behave.
For simplicity's sake, I shall limit my attention to Hart's narrower point that there is not necessarily a moral obligation to obey
the law. Because this point is narrower than what might be included
within the broad scope of a "separation of law and morals," what I
have to say about it will be seen to apply even more forcefully to any
broader positivistic claim.
One can imagine an argument that would establish the sort of
"moral neutrality" to which Hart refers, along the following lines:
(1) If conditions L are satisfied, there is law. (2) There is a moral
obligation to obey the law only if conditions O are satisfied. (3) The
satisfaction of conditions L does not entail the satisfaction of conditions 0. So there is not necessarily a moral obligation to obey the
law. For such an argument to work, it would have to state (1) a true
analysis of what it is for there to be law and (2) the conditions that
must be satisfied if one is to be under an obligation to obey the law.
No one has ever offered an argument of this sort.
An even broader argument would be required to explain how
positivists who disagree among themselves about the specification of
both conditions L and conditions O could embrace such a conclusion. For example, (1) would have to be replaced by a "meta-theory" concerning the generic sorts of conditions that must go into any
adequate analysis oflaw. Furthermore, this meta-theory would have
to satisfy more than Hart's requirement that the terms used be "flatly
descriptive," because that alone would not guarantee that the satisfaction of conditions L would not entail the satisfaction of conditions
0. This is because any adequate theory of the conditions under
which one can have an obligation to obey the law must likewise state
them in descriptive terms. And it would add nothing to insist that
the terms used in L be "normatively neutral," because in the present
context this means only that L should not entail 0, which is what the
argument is all about.
To put the matter simply, the positivist believes that, whatever L
and O shouldprove to he, (3) will turn out to he true. This is one of
the principal elements of positivism - it is part of the positivist's
"meta-theory'' about law. It is an axiom of legal positivism that any
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adequate analysis oflaw will respect the truth of (3). Let us suppose,
then, that the positivist's "separation of law and morals" is a fundamental principle of the positivist tradition. Are we to infer that it
must be arbitrary? I do not think so.
To see this, consider the following sort of argument: (a) the institution of chattel slavery is sometimes permitted and enforced by law;
(b) no plausible moral position is capable of justifying the claim that
people who are forced into slavery, and treated as chattel slaves have
in fact been treated, are under a moral obligation to obey the law
(including, of course, the laws that enforce chattel slavery); (c) if so,
then no plausible moral position is capable of accommodating the
claim that there is necessarily a moral obligation to obey the law.
I take (a) to be unproblematic. The crux of such an argument is
step (b). This assumes that we already know a good deal about the
sorts of considerations that are relevant to claims about moral obligations. It should suffice for our purposes to mention three examples. Some hold that an obligation to obey the law turns on the
effects of disobedience as compared with obedience. Others claim
that such an obligation depends primarily on considerations of fairness. Still others believe that such an obligation derives from a "social contract." But it seems at best extravagant to suppose that
considerations of utility, fairness, or voluntary undertakings akin to
contracts are capable of showing that there are always good moral
reasons for chattel slaves (or indeed others) to obey the laws enforcing slavery. Sometimes laws merit no respect at all.
The idea that there is not necessarily a moral obligation to obey
the law does not imply that there is never a general obligation to
obey the law, that is, an obligation which applies to all persons
within a given jurisdiction and to all its laws, including those that are
deficient from a moral point of view. Our moral sensibilities are sufficiently developed to distinguish between these two ideas, just as
they are developed enough to compare how people may be treated
under a system oflaw with reasonable notions of how they should be
treated. We are not, after all, starting such inquiries from scratch.
We can draw upon thousands of years oflegal experience and moral
reflection.
So my suggestion is that the most plausible case, perhaps the only
plausible case, that can be made for the positivist's "separation of
law and morals" depends on the exercise of moral judgment. I put
the matter this way not to suggest that moral judgment turns upon
some infallible and mysterious moral "intuition," but rather to emphasize that such a conclusion does not rely upon a single wellgrounded theory of obligation. Anyone who wishes to challenge this
element of positivism ought to try to prove the contrary position,
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taking into account the full range of relevant human experience,
both legal and moral.
IL

MORISON ON AUSTIN

Morison's John Austin is the second volume in a valuable new
series on legal theorists. It is an ambitious book, covering not only
Austin's life and work but also the origins and impact of his ideas. It
is packed with information and excellent summaries of relevant writings by Austin and many others. A running critical commentary is
provided. The book concludes with a vigorous defense of Austin's
general approach, despite the serious shortcomings of his specific
theories; a provocative critique of recent approaches, most notably
Hart's; and positive suggestions for progress in legal theory, which
draw inspiration from the work of Lasswell and McDougal.
· Morison's judgment of Austin is exemplified in his discussion of
the most general aspects of Austin's theory of law. Austin, like Bentham before him, held that law is to be understood as a set of coercive commands issued by the uncommanded commanders in a
community. Morison's reservations about Austin's attempt to develop and defend this sort of theory are largely in agreement with
criticisms that have been made familiar by Hart. For example: lawmaking presupposes legal authority, which is itself conferred by law.
Thus, Austin is unable to account for the legal status of laws without
falling into circularity. The Austinian conception of a legal "sovereign" is unequal to its task of explaining how the existence of law is
a matter of ordinary empirical fact. But this does not lead Morison
to infer that Austin's underlying aim of analyzing law in straightforwardly factual terms is misguided. Law is, he argues, a matter of
empirical fact. Austin's mistake was to identify the wrong sort of
fact as the basis of law.
Morison claims that Austin alone among prominent English jurists "presented the fundamental philosophical problem of legal theory to himself' in "the right way" (p. 147). The distinctive argument
of this book is a defense and elaboration of this theme, and a substantial portion of the book is devoted to it. I shall discuss three
aspects of Morison's argument: (A) his "naive empiricism" (p. 178);
(B) his analysis of normative judgments; and (C) his objections to
Hart's legal theory.
A.

"Naive Empiricism"

Morison endorses and attributes to Austin a traditional kind of
philosophical empiricism that has in fact been quite influential and
important. It may be summarized, at least in part, as follows. Reality consists entirely in what can be observed. The only things that
can be observed are particular facts. There is nothing but particular

734

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:722

facts; to suppose otherwise is to indulge in metaphysical nonsense.
Truth mirrors reality, so statements that do not purport to represent
particular facts are meaningless. A significant true statement is
either an accurate picture of a particular fact or else can be exhaustively analyzed into a collection of such pictures. Thus,
a true theory is only a compendium of particular truths. It is only the
terms of the theory which are general and abstract, so that it abbreviates or condenses particular truths. [P. 142].

That is the basic theory. It will profit us to consider some of the
details that remain unclear.
Morison wishes to embrace what he calls "consistent empiricism"
(p. 143). I would suppose that a consistent empiricism would take
seriously the methods and findings of empirical science, in the first
instance those branches of empirical science which, experience
shows, have been most successful in increasing our knowledge of reality. That Morison does not do so is suggested in several ways. His
general statements of empiricist philosophy would seem to imply
that knowledge of reality is accessible only by means of direct observation. But in one place, at least, he allows that we can legitimately
use logical methods to derive some truths from others (pp. 195-96).
This would seem to allow for the possibility of achieving some
knowledge of reality indirectly, that is, by rigorous deduction from
particular truths already known by means of direct observation. But
if Morison restricts the legitimate uses of logic to rigorous deductions, then he is excluding nondeductive logic, which does not guarantee that the conclusions of good arguments are true whenever the
premises are true, but only supports conclusions inconclusively, that
is, leaving it open that the conclusions might fall short of the truth.
And this is important because it is arguable that nondeductive inference is the principal method in virtually all realms of systematic inquiry. Empirical science, for example, employs nondeductive
inference to increase our knowledge of reality, without insuring that
its conclusions are precise pictures of reality even when its premises
impeccably represent pieces of reality.
Does Morison's "empiricism" then conflict with the most rigorous practice of the most successful empirical sciences? This is even
more clearly suggested by his explicit rejection of the idea that there
might be "ulterior explanations" of observed facts (p. 143). Much of
the success of natural science turns upon its capacity to explain regularities in natural phenomena by reference to microstructures and
mechanisms that cannot be directly observed and the determination
of which relies essentially upon nondeductive logical methods. According to Morison, theories are true only insofar as they can be analyzed in terms of directly observable facts. But, most scientific
theories are not reducible to observable facts in any such way, as
their implications are not so limited and they make essential refer-
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ence to unobservables. Thus, much of what experience seems to
show that we learn from the enterprise of science would be rejected
by Morison's sort of empiricism as metaphysical nonsense. This is,
as I have said, a familiar sort of empiricist view, but it has not fared
well in recent philosophical inquiries, not because it is too consistently empiricist, but rather because it ignores some important elements of accumulated human experience.
Consider now the nature of observation. Morison presumably
wishes us to limit what counts as observation in.a consistently empiricist way. He asserts, however, that "consistent empiricism requires
that we trust what we appear to observe in the first place" (p. 143).
This is, at best, puzzling. For experience seems to show that there
can be such things as observational error, illusions, and hallucinations, that is, sense impressions which do not correspond to reality.
Does Morison mean to deny this? If so, he would seem obliged to
endorse an even more radical "empiricism" than he explicitly avows
- some version of what philosophers call "phenomenalism." This
sort of view identifies ultimate reality with the mere contents of sense
impressions. It regards statements about ordinary material objects,
such as tables and chairs, as logical constructs out of statements
about visual and other sense impressions.
But the phenomenalist program is inherently problematic. Statements about ordinary material objects are no more reducible to
statements about actual sense impressions than are statements about
microstructures and hidden mechanisms reducible to statements
about material objects. And it seems clear that phenomenalism puts
the cart before the horse, for the phenomenalist program requires
that we construct statements about material objects by piecing together elements of sensation. But we cannot even begin to determine
how sense impressions must be related to one another so as to count
as impressions of a single material object without considerable understanding of the ordinary material world, including, for example,
our knowledge of perspective, reflection, refraction, and the like.
And this knowledge gradually acquires considerable reference to
"ulterior explanations" (as, for example, our knowledge of refraction
relies upon our understanding of how light waves are affected by
moving between materials of different density at angles other than
ninety degrees to their common surfaces). Indeed, one would suppose that what is to count as true observation, from an empiricist
point of view, is itself something to be determined by an understanding of how material objects are capable of interacting.
For reasons like these, it does seem disingenuous for Morison to
characterize his view as "naive empiricism." It is by no means naive,
because it involves rejecting as metaphysical nonsense the methods
and results of the most successful of empirical disciplines and corre-
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sponds to little of our ordinary ideas about the nature of truth and
reality. Furthermore, Morison gives us absolutely no reason to endorse this narrow conception of empiricism.
B. Normative Judgments

Morison sets great stock in what he calls "traditional logic"
which he claims represents "the wisdom of the ages" (p. 147). It is
ironic that an avowed empiricist should pay more respect to traditional logic than to empirical science, but that is not the focus of our
present concern. Both deductive and nondeductive logic deal with
indicative statements, which can be either true or false. Morison believes that consistent empiricism must reject the idea of any other
type of logic, such as the logic of imperatives first laid out by Bentham. He writes:
For the naive empiricist there is only one logic - covering the general
propositional and implicational characteristics which everything we
observe has - universally. If the term logic is applied to more specialized structures, this implies for him that there are different kinds of
realities, which is unacceptable because it is then impossible to represent the relations of those realities by propositions which would fall
within any of the realities being supposed. [P. 190].

Thus, Morison believes that imperatives must somehow be reducible
to indicatives, that there is no need for any sort of "deontic logic,"
and that Hart and others who believe that law, because it incorporates action-guiding sentences akin to imperatives, requires such additional logic, are fundamentally misguided.
I believe that Morison's concerns are misplaced and that his positive suggestions about the logic of normative statements are, when
clear, insupportable. Morison does not tell us how to effect the reduction of statements that are not indicatives into indicatives; he
simply expresses the firm conviction that it must be done. But his
reasoning appears confused. The reasons why imperatives like
"Shut the door" and "Keep your promises" appear to require a special logic are: (a) such statements are neither true nor false; (b) traditional logic applies only to statements that are either true or false (or
that are interpretable in such terms), and so does not apply to imperatives; but (c) it seems reasonable to suppose that there can be logical
relations among imperatives (for example, between some general
and some particular imperatives). Morison ignores these considerations. He is concerned that acknowledging the possibility of such a
logic would conflict with the empiricist conception of reality.
But this is silly. If it is a fact that Jones said "Shut the door,"
then a statement asserting that fact is simply true. That fact is an
element of empirical reality. The idea that "Shut the door" may be
regulated by a logic whose realm is not that of truth and falsity does
not imply that there is anything but empirical reality. That threat
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might be real if we supposed that Jones' utterance were either true or
false and thus could be thought to represent a different reality. But it
is neither true nor false. So the threat is imaginary.
Morison's misplaced concern is explained by his narrow conception of meaningfulness. He simply does not acknowledge that there
can be any sort of linguistic meaning other than that possessed by
simple indicative statements. But it seems true that imperative utterances can be meaningful, and whatever meaning imperative utterances have is not identical to that of indicatives. There is more to
linguistic meaning than Morison allows himself to believe. And this
point seems neutral with respect to empiricism.
Morison does make one fairly clear suggestion about the analysis
of normative judgments. When a person makes an "ought" statement, he is making a double assertion: (1) he is asserting "his own
approbation"; and (2) he is asserting "that the approval follows from
something approved by both his hearers and himself' (p. 143). So a
second-person "ought" statement is to be understood as carrying the
following sort of meaning:
'All things required for the achievement of X are things that you and I
approve', 'Y is a thing required for the achievement ofX', 'therefore Y
is a thing that you and I approve - even if you have not immediately
recognized this.' [P. 143].

In considering this proposal, one should first take note of the fact
that it has no clear bearing on the possibility of a logic of imperatives. For a statement to the effect that someone or other ought to do
Y is an indicative. The same applies to statements concerning what
is right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, fair or unfair, commendable or reprehensible. There is no reason to assume that traditional logic is inapplicable to such statements - at least until we
have good reason to suppose that they are neither true nor false.
In the second place, Morison's reasons for analyzing such statements in terms of the speaker's assertion of his own approval, etc.,
are vaguely negative and do not support any particular analysis.
Here is all that Morison says that seems at all relevant to his proposal: (1) "the attempt to suggest that one is uttering propositions
about something objective outside oneself when making moral judgments is . . . an attempt to disguise the personal reference of the
statement being made" (p. 170); and (2) "we do not think it possible
to justify our own preferences except by referring to others of our
preferences, which may or may not appeal to the persons addressed"
(p. 175).
It is not clear how best to analyze the varieties of moral judgments, but it does seem clear that Morison's proposal is anything but
"naive empiricism." For there are many respects in which it conflicts with the character of ordinary moral reasoning. While it is true
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that we seek common ground with those we wish to persuade of the
truth of our moral judgments, it is not true that we are always prepared to retract our judgments when such common ground is absent.
But on Morison's proposed analysis, I must regard as false any moral
judgment I have made that I realize others are not committed to
accepting. Not only does this not square with observable linguistic
practice, it also conflicts with our idea that moral understanding is
not a matter of universal acceptance. Morality is not inherently conventionalistic in the way Morison implies. One cannot construct a
plausible empiricist conception of morality simply by extrapolating
from dogmatic philosophical views about the subjectivity of moral
judgment.
C. Morison versus Hart
Morison believes that Hart's approach to legal theory is too "conceptualist" (p. 183). I can suggest what Morison means by first
sketching Hart's conception oflaw2 and then comparing it with some
of Morison's ideas.
Hart believes that a legal system at a given time has what I shall
call a normative content. For example, it requires some acts, prohibits others, and leaves some to individual choice. Of course, there are
other sorts oflegal norms, according to Hart, such as those that confer legal powers. Hart conceives of this content as determined by a
set of norms that he calls rules. Rules have general application and
have implications for particular cases. Most legal rules have legal
standing within a system because they satisfy certain criteria that
have been incorporated into the system. These criteria can be
thought of as collected in "rules of recognition," which can then be
thought of as applicable in determining what other rules exist within
the system.
Two qualifications should be added. First, rules must have some
significant measure of determinate content, but they are always to
some extent vague or "open textured." This applies to all rules
within a system, including its rules of recognition. So the normative
content of a legal system at any given time is somewhat determinate
and somewhat indeterminate. Second, each system has some basic
rules, including a fundamental rule of recognition, whose existence is
determined not by such criteria but rather by their being accepted as
fundamental to the system by officials within the system, who regularly apply the standards that these fundamental rules may be
thought of as including. So law is a matter of rules, but it is also, on
Hart's view, a matter of fact. It is a matter of empirical fact that
certain fundamental rules are accepted by officials; that, by the crite2. See generally H.L.A. HART,
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ria included in those rules, other rules exist; and that the various
rules within the system are generally observed by those to whom
they apply.
Furthermore, Hart makes clear that this conception of law has
the virtue of respecting the distinction between what the law requires
or allows and how officials decide questions that arise under the law.
It makes sense not only to think of officials making law as they decide cases (when, for example, the law is insufficiently determinate to
decide a case) but also to think of officials acting contrary to law,
making legal mistakes, and so on. Law provides a standard for appraising much official as well as private behavior.
Morison believes that Hart places too much emphasis on rules
and the systematic character of a legal system. In part this seems
motivated by Morison's misplaced concern that Hart is committed to
acknowledging some fictitious nonempirical reality when he suggests
that norms require a special logic. Another reason is that Morison
believes that law is not as centralized as Hart's approach implies. I
believe this second reason likewise rests on a misconception. Hart
would say, I think, that legal systems may be more or less centralized, compatibly with his general analysis oflaw. How centralized a
legal system happens to be depends on how legal authority within it
is centralized. Nothing in Hart's general approach implies that legal
authority cannot be divided and dispersed.
Morison also suggests that in place of rules we should think of
authoritative legal decisions as generating "commitments" to· deal
with cases in a certain regular way (p. 181). What Morison leaves
unclear is whether these "commitments" have implications for official behavior which respect the distinctions emphasized by Hart, between determinate and indeterminate law, on the one hand, and
between sound and unsound official decisions, on the other.
Morison's alternative approach to legal theory is somewhat unclear because it is embedded within a larger program for studying
decisionmaking processes within communities, following proposals
that he attributes to Lasswell and McDougal. The theory of law is
seen as an integral part of a more general study.
The idea that legal theory needs integration into a broader study
of human institutions makes perfectly good sense. It does not follow, however, that we can understand law better by ignoring concepts that are embedded in the law. For these help to determine the
character of the institution that is there to be studied. It may tum
out that some of the ways in which jurists look at the law are distorted by preconceptions or illusions. But this can only be shown by
first identifying the various ways in which jurists look at the law and
demonstrating that they distort empirical reality. A consistent empiricism can proceed in no other way.

